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INTRODUCTION
On February 1, 2011, the U.S. Small Business Administration
(SBA) announced that it would implement the new Women-Owned
Small Business (WOSB) Federal Contract Program on February 4,
2011.1 This proclamation adhered to the implementation date prom-
ised by the SBA’s final rule, which the Federal Register had published
in the fall of 2010.2 The announcement represented the culmination
of a slow-moving legislative process that has sought to address the
under-representation of women in federal contracting.3
Women’s relative inability to procure federal funding is not a new
concern, nor is it a new aspect of governmental policy: the SBA has a
long-standing goal of allocating five percent of federal contracts to
women-owned businesses.4 This aspiration, though admirable, has not
yet succeeded. In Fiscal Year 2009, only 3.7 percent of federal con-
tracts were awarded to women-owned businesses.5
The government’s failure to reach its goal is troubling for several
reasons. Although the statistical gap might be explicable if women-
1. Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., SBA Announces Contracting Program for
Women-Owned Small Businesses (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://www.sba.gov/content
/sba-announces-contracting-program-women-owned-small-businesses.
2. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,258
(Oct. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, & 134).
3. Id.
4. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, S. 1587, 103d Cong. § 7106(a)(2)(A)
(1994) (enacted).
5. The Women’s Procurement Program, WOMEN IMPACTING PUB. POL’Y, 1 (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.wipp.org/resource/resmgr/issues/summary_wipp.pdf.
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owned businesses had dwindled over the last decade and a half, the
opposite is in fact true.6 Between 1997 and 2002, “women-owned firms
were growing at twice the rate of all other groups,” and of small busi-
nesses within the same time frame, “women had the largest growth
compared to other groups.”7 One study offers a startling analogy to
foster appreciation for the economic muscle of these ventures: “If U.S.-
based women-owned businesses were their own country, they would
have the 5th largest GDP in the world, trailing closely behind Ger-
many, and ahead of countries including France, United Kingdom and
Italy.”8 In general, “[t]he proportion of women working in management,
business, and finance jobs has increased from 9 percent to 14 percent
since 1983.”9 Why, then, has this enduring group been unable to pro-
cure a reasonable portion of available contracts? The incapacity of
the government to meet its policy goal cannot be attributed merely
to economic factors.
The advancement of women’s economic equality has been an en-
during issue in political discourse,10 and the question of whether and
how to provide government set-asides to women bears special relevance
in the recent stormy economic weather. On a broad scale, women have
managed to hold their own in employment: in 2009, approximately
sixty-one percent of women over twenty years of age participated in
the U.S. labor force.11 This holding pattern arises after a prolonged
and impressive rise in employment for women over the last fifty
years.12 Men, however, have consistently fared better; although their
overall employment has fallen slightly in the past fifty years, it has
always remained higher than that of women.13 Women have histori-
cally represented a marginal, though growing, portion of national
business, and “in troubled economic times minority business has been
traditionally that segment of the economy ‘hit first, hit hardest, and
hit longest.’”14 WOSBs fall into two economically unlucky categories:
6. CTR. FOR WOMEN’S BUS. RESEARCH, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF WOMEN-OWNED
BUSINESSES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2009), available at http://www.nwbc.gov/sites /default
/files/economicimpactstu.pdf.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & BUDGET & EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WOMEN
IN AMERICA: INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 33 (2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/Women_in_America.pdf
[hereinafter WOMEN IN AMERICA].
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. WOMEN IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 29.
12. Id. (“The labor force participation rate for women (age 20 and older) nearly doubled
between 1948 (32 percent) and 1997 (61 percent).”).
13. Id.
14. Maj. Thomas Jefferson Hasty, III, Minority Business Enterprise Development and
the Small Business Administration’s 8(A) Program: Past, Present, and (Is There a) Future?,
MIL. L. REV., Summer 1994, at 1, 2 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-956, at 1 (1982) (internal
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they are both minority-owned and small ventures. As a minority,
women suffer from the notorious “pay gap,” by which women possess-
ing equal education perpetually earn less than their male counter-
parts.15 As small businesses, they possess relatively little capital with
which to stay afloat in a tumultuous market.16
Small businesses have indeed come forth to report their recent
struggles with market tremors.17 The challenges they face are com-
pounded, somewhat ironically, by the federal government, which has
responded to the recession with skyrocketing tax increases.18 Busi-
nesses have reacted by going into survival mode, and their reluctance
to increase their work force has perpetuated slow job growth.19 This
chain of events perversely sustains the very inhospitable landscape
that both the government and the businesses themselves are striv-
ing to move past.
Even companies that have enjoyed relative success feel the pres-
sure: as one business owner reported, “[w]e did well last year, hired two
people, but the taxes ate through the income we had.”20 The federal
government is invested in finding ways to break the vicious cycle and
buoy these small businesses, intending that they help “jump-start”
economic recovery with their profits.21 Given that the work force
behind these struggling business ventures is varied in race, gender,
and other attributes,22 the Program faces a significant question: why
do women-owned businesses deserve special treatment?
Promoters of federal programs that aid WOSBs argue that far
from allocating set-asides to arbitrary groups, the programs are
validated by WOSBs’ economic worth;23 by protecting their vitality
and viability for future growth, the government hopes likewise to
stimulate the economy by promoting company expansion and job
quotation marks omitted)).
15. WOMEN IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 32.
16. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN., WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESSES
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/wb/media/Women-
Owned_Businesses_in_the_21st_Century.pdf (stating that women-owned businesses start
with less capital and often encounter less favorable loan conditions, or are less willing to
take on risk by seeking outside capital).
17. V. Dion Haynes, Small Businesses Feel Squeezed by Obama Policies, WASH.
POST, Sept. 6, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/03
/AR2010090305391.html.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id.
22. See infra Part I.C.
23. Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., SBA Proposes Women-Owned Small
Business Rule to Expand Access to Federal Contracting Opportunities (Mar. 2, 2010), avail-
able at, http://www.wipp.org/resource/resmgr/procurement_committee /news_release_10-
05.pdf.
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creation.24 This Note will first examine the substance of the SBA’s
most recent women-oriented legislation, including its aims, support-
ing data, early reactions to its methods, and the SBA’s responses to
these comments. It will then discuss the history of women’s role in
the U.S. economy, including past legislation that has sought to aid
women and case law that has established the constitutional justifi-
cation for government set-asides. Finally, this Note will address the
economic utility of providing help to WOSBs and the forecast for the
most recently implemented program that seeks to supply this much-
needed and much-deserved aid.
I. LEGISLATION
A. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program
On October 7, 2010, the Federal Register published the SBA’s final
rule.25 The rule seeks to “level the playing field” for women in the fed-
eral contracting arena, thereby acknowledging that an unfair disparity
has existed for many years and that past legislative efforts have not
adequately addressed the problem.26 The SBA commenced imple-
mentation of the final rule on February 4, 2011, assuring that the
Program would “be fully implemented” within the coming year “with
the first contracts expected to be awarded by the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2011.”27 At the time of this Note’s completion, shortly after
official implementation, the practical effects of the Program remain
to be seen.28
The final rule had been preceded by a proposal, published in
March, followed by a two-month period in which the SBA solicited
public comments.29 By May 3, 2010, the SBA had received 998 com-
ments, “virtually all [of which] supported the rule, commended SBA
for its efforts, and urged the agency to expeditiously promulgate
final regulations since WOSBs have been waiting eleven years for
the program.”30 The large volume of responses indicates widespread
24. Haynes, supra note 17.
25. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,258
(Oct. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, & 134).
26. Id.
27. Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., supra note 1.
28. There has, however, been some internet commentary in late 2011 expressing frus-
tration at the Program’s slow-moving nature. See Lourdes Martin-Rosa, Women-Owned
Small Businesses Still Not Getting Their Fair Share of Government Contracts—Here’s
How to Change That, GOVWIN (Dec. 13, 2011, 12:17 PM), http://govwin.com/lourdes_blog
/womenowned-small-businesses-still-not/332143 (urging WOSBs “to step up to the plate”
and identify themselves as qualified to participate in the set-aside program).
29. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at 62,258.
30. Id.
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relief in the WOSB community, which has endured years of awaiting
such changes, and the SBA is cognizant of this mindset.31 SBA
Administrator Karen Mills, speaking in conjunction with the rule’s
proposal, succinctly stated its economic and social purposes:
Women-owned small businesses are one of the fastest growing
segments of our economy, yet they continue to be under-repre-
sented when it comes to federal contracting . . . . Across the
country, women are leading strong, innovative companies, and
we know that securing federal contracts can be the opportunity
that helps them take their businesses to the next level, expand
their volume and create good-paying jobs. This proposed rule is
a step forward in helping ensure greater access for women-
owned small businesses in the federal marketplace.32
The rule, by implementing new changes, hopes to finally meet Con-
gress’s more than sixteen-year-old objective of allocating five percent
of federal contracts to women-owned businesses.33
Congress had addressed the lack of progress, and even regression,
regarding this goal as far back as 2000, noting that between 1997 and
1999, federal procurement by women-owned businesses decreased by
a shocking thirty-eight percent.34 This decrease occurred despite the
fact that women-owned business comprised “a vital element in the un-
precedented growth and productivity of the American economy” in the
1990s, and despite the fact that “[n]early half of the businesses owned
by women provide[d] goods and services to the federal government.”35
The Committee on Small Business gave several reasons, based
on testimony, for the lagging percentage of procurements for women.
One was that “[c]ontract bundling, or the consolidation of smaller
contract requirements into larger contracts, makes it difficult for
women-owned small businesses to file responsive bids to bundled
solicitations.”36 Although the practice of bundling has striven to sim-
plify and streamline the acquisition of contracts when necessary,37 its
31. See id.
32. Press Release, Small Bus. Admin., supra note 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, S. 1587, 103d Cong. § 7106(a)(2)(A)
(1994) (enacted).
34. H.R. REP. NO. 106-879 (2000), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T
?&report=hr879&dbname=106&.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CONTRACT BUNDLING: A STRATEGY FOR
INCREASING FEDERAL FUNDING FOR SMALL BUSINESS 3 (2002), available at http://oamp
.od.nih.gov/ProgramNotes/ContractBundling/contractbundlingreport.pdf [hereinafter
CONTRACT BUNDLING].
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problematic effect on smaller, more vulnerable businesses has long
been acknowledged.38
Another reason for WOSBs’ lack of success is that the federal
government, in adopting efficiency-motivated practices for procure-
ment, “also may perpetuate the use of well-known firms that are not
women-owned businesses.”39 The Committee stressed the negative
impact of these practices on women, stating that “the drive for
efficiency in procurement often places Congressionally-mandated
contracting goals for small businesses in general, and women-owned
businesses in particular, in jeopardy.”40 The current rule seeks to
mend these discrepancies by allowing previously disadvantaged busi-
nesses to tap into the resources of the federal government.41 The
SBA has evidently decided that, given the dire effects of bundling on
smaller businesses and WOSBs in particular, the economic commu-
nity is better served by protecting the smaller parties’ interests above
procurement efficiency.
The rule does not offer across-the-board protection for women-
owned businesses. Its first major change is to identify eighty-three
industries associated with the under-representation of WOSBs; of
these eighty-three, thirty-eight represent areas of “substantial” under-
representation.42 For this subset, the SBA may waive the requirement
that WOSBs be “economically disadvantaged” in order to be eligible for
assistance.43 The SBA selected these industries by implementing a
study, commissioned by the RAND Foundation, in which both the share
of contracts awarded and the dollar value awarded to WOSBs were
analyzed; the SBA then used this analysis to determine “a disparity
ratio” between WOSBs and other contract awardees.44
This methodology is decidedly more forgiving than the one used
in an earlier version of the rule, involving a separate RAND study,
which calculated disparity based on the “share of contracting dollars”
38. Letter from Office of Management and Budget to The President (Oct. 29, 2002)
in CONTRACT BUNDLING, supra note 37, at 3 (“American small businesses bring innovation,
creativity, competition and lower costs to the federal table. When these businesses are
excluded from federal opportunities through contract bundling, our agencies, small
businesses and the taxpayers lose.”).
39. H.R. REP. NO. 106-879, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T
?&report=hr879&dbname=106&.
40. Id.
41. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,258,
62,258 (Oct. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, & 134).
42. Id. at 62,262.
43. Id. at 62,258 (internal quotation marks omitted). In order for a WOSB to qualify
as “economically disadvantaged,” it must be majority-owned by a woman or women
whose individual net worth is under $750,000 and the fair market value of all assets
must be under $6 million. Id. at 62,284–85.
44. Id. at 62,259.
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alone.45 By including the actual number of contracts in addition to
dollar value, the rule attempts to create a more accurate assessment
of under-representation, thereby identifying the industries in which
WOSBs are in actual need of help.46
While the newer method, by combining both factors, addresses
the earlier problem of agencies presenting skewed results (i.e., a high
number of awards to WOSBs representing a relatively small dollar
amount, and vice versa),47 the National Research Council (NRC) has
pointed out several possible points of error in such disparity studies.48
The first is the fact that businesses may deceptively classify themselves
as “women-owned.”49 Such fraud can occur when businesses transfer
ownership to women in order to qualify for the set-asides, or when
“front” businesses substantially subcontract away their award to
non-women-owned companies.50 Businesses may also mistakenly, or
fraudulently, identify themselves as “small.”51 The SBA affixes different
thresholds for “small” depending on the industry, and shifting factors,
such as changes in a company’s staff, make it a difficult quality to pin
down.52 Both human error and deceit therefore represent undesirable
and potentially unmanageable factors that feed into the analysis.
Aside from mistakes and willful misrepresentation, “estimates
of underrepresentation vary widely when different measures, so-called
disparity ratios, are employed.”53 Where such broad variation exists,
the choice of methodology may appear arbitrary or self-serving.54 Any
study the SBA uses to identify the industries of under-representation
could therefore lead to protest, either by WOSBs who feel they are
being treated unfairly or other businesses that feel they are being
inched out of the bidding process by overinclusively protective programs.
The SBA-implemented study identifies a list of industries desig-
nated by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
codes55 that includes manufacturing and goods and services, such as
45. Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., supra note 23 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
46. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at 62,259.
47. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ANALYZING INFORMATION ON WOMEN-OWNED SMALL
BUSINESSES IN FEDERAL CONTRACTING 42–43 (2005), available at http://www.nap.edu
/catalog/11245.html.
48. Id. at 42.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id.
53. ELAINE REARDON ET AL., KAUFFMAN-RAND INST. FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP PUB.
POLICY, THE UTILIZATION OF WOMEN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESSES IN FEDERAL CONTRACTING
2 (2007), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2007/RAND_TR442.pdf.
54. See id. at 3–5.
55. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,258,
62,259 (Oct. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, & 134).
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“Water, Sewage and Other Systems;” “Residential Building Con-
struction;” “Commercial and Service Industry Machinery Manufac-
turing;” “Automotive Repair and Maintenance;” “Scientific Research
and Development Services;” and “Waste Treatment and Disposal.”56
The breadth of the list is significant, given that an earlier proposal
published in 2007 only recognized a total of four industries engaged
in under-representation.57 These industries included the following:
“National security and international affairs; Coating, engraving,
heat treating and allied activities; Household and institutional
furniture and kitchen cabinet manufacturing; and certain [m]otor
vehicle dealers.”58
The earlier version and its minuscule list of designated industries
had generated fierce protest amongst advocates for WOSBs.59 One of
its critics, Senator John Kerry, called it “a slap in the face to women
business owners” and accused the SBA of “cherry picking data” in
order to create a highly exclusive program.60 The bill was further
criticized by Representative Nydia Velazquez, then-Chair of the House
Small Business Committee: “[t]his proposal would create an initiative
benefitting only a tiny fraction of the businesswomen of this country.
It is a sad day for the female entrepreneurs of this country when the
administration will use whatever means necessary to hinder their
participation in the federal marketplace.”61 The final rule, a drastic
departure from the widely unpopular proposal of 2007,62 was clearly
drafted in at least partial response to the violent backlash.
The changes to the new rule have not, however, entirely quelled
criticism.63 The SBA acknowledges that “dozens of comments,”
although supporting the dramatic expansion of the list, requested
that even more industries be included.64 Some comments called for
all of the NAICS codes to be included, since this would put the wo-
men’s procurement program in line with other protective programs.65
56. Id. at 62,262.
57. Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., supra note 23.
58. Sharon McLoone, SBA Upsets Lawmakers with Contracting Plan, WASH. POST.
(Dec. 28, 2007, 3:15 PM), http://blog.washingtonpost.com/small-business/2007/12/sba_
upsets_lawmakers_with_cont .html.
59. See, e.g., id. (quoting various critics of the list of included industries).
60. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Compare Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg.
62,258, 62,259 (Oct. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, &
134) (explaining that there are 83 industries eligible for assistance under the final
version of the plan), with McLoone, supra note 58 (listing the four industries eligible
under the 2007 plan).
63. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at 62,259.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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The SBA responded that its selected list was the result of a statute-
mandated study on under-representation, cited above, and that it has
calculated disparity ratios to the best of its ability.66 As previously
discussed, however, the methodology behind these calculations is
extremely variable and subject to criticism for unfairness.67
Additionally, federal agencies no longer need to meet the “onerous”
certification that they have engaged in past discrimination against
WOSBs as a prerequisite to utilizing the Program.68 The SBA’s list of
industries, and not the past practices of the agencies themselves, is now
deemed a sufficient source of data to determine whether WOSBs are
eligible for the Program.69
Some commenters protested that, given the controversy surround-
ing the calculation of the disparity ratio that determined the list of in-
dustries, the rule should retain the “[a]gency-by-[a]gency” approach to
determine under-representation instead of simply reading from the
master list of industries.70 The SBA responded by once again defend-
ing the disparity findings as “viable and appropriate,”71 and conclud-
ing that the chosen methodology meets the intermediate scrutiny
standard applied by the Supreme Court to gender-based distribution
of benefits.72
WOSBs and economically disadvantaged WOSBs (EDWOSBs)
may now certify themselves, with the proper documentation, and be
certified by third parties in order to be eligible for the Program.73 This
new provision has been lauded in some of the comments: “[o]f the al-
most 1,000 comments received overall on the rule, most of them com-
mented on the certification,” and “[a]t least one comment stated that it
was good that SBA recognized the cost of certification and provided
alternative compliance requirements, such as the self-certification.”74
66. Id. (“Using the RAND report, SBA identified a viable and appropriate
methodology . . . . Accordingly, in view of the statute’s explicit requirements, SBA cannot
simply deem a NAICS code eligible under the WOSB Program based solely on a request
set forth in the public comments.”).
67. See supra notes 47–61 and accompanying text.
68. The Women’s Procurement Program, supra note 5, at 1.
69. Id.
70. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at 62,263.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 62,263–64. The case law will be discussed infra Part I.C.
73. Id. at 62,268. The SBA has approved four organizations to handle certification,
including the El Paso Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the National Women Business
Owners Corporation, the U.S. Women’s Chamber of Commerce, and the Women’s
Business Enterprise National Council. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract
Program, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.sba.gov/content/contracting
-opportunities-women-owned-small-businesses.
74. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at
62,268–69.
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Other commenters worried about sufficient monitoring of the self-
certification option, stressing that it should be allowed “as long as
documents were provided to verify eligibility.”75
The comments reflect an overarching concern about fairness in
the certification process. Those focused on the interest of WOSBs call
for an easier, more streamlined process, while those concerned with
the integrity of the system call for constraints and vigilant screening
of who is being certified.76 A WOSB is identified summarily as a small
business concern in which “at least 51 percent [is] owned by one or
more women and the management and daily business operations of
the concern is controlled by one or more women.”77 As discussed previ-
ously in the disparity study analysis, such broad definitions may allow
companies to manipulate the definitions to their own advantage.78
In order to ensure that ineligible businesses do not take advan-
tage of the set-asides, the SBA has also implemented several mea-
sures to fortify the “eligibility examination procedure,” including
requirements of adequate documentation.79 The rule also enumerates
enforcement measures; for example, a finding by the SBA that a
business has falsely represented itself to be women-owned, small,
or otherwise eligible will result in disbarment.80 The SBA reserves
the right to monitor businesses for such fraud by conducting unan-
nounced site visits.81 Finally, a contracting officer or third party has
the opportunity to appeal the SBA’s finding of eligibility by filing a
“status protest” with the Office of Hearing and Appeals.82
The rule’s benefits are further tempered by the fact that con-
tract awards have specific limitations.83 For manufacturing con-
tracts, the contract award price must be equal to or less than $5
million; for other contracts, the cap is $3 million, and the price
“awarded must be fair and reasonable.”84 The Program also excludes
sole-source contracts, meaning that government “[c]ontracting offi-
cer[s] must determine that there is a reasonable expectation that
two or more WOSBs will submit offers for the contract [in industries
in which they are substantially under-represented].”85
75. Id. at 62,269.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 62,258 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 632(n)).
78. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 42.
79. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at 62,276.
80. The Women’s Procurement Program, supra note 5, at 3.
81. Id.
82. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id. at 2.
84. Id.
85. Id.
2012] THE ANATOMY OF A HELPING HAND 635
One possible condition, which the SBA explicitly rejects, is the
suggestion that specific WOSBs should be limited in how many con-
tracts they receive; the SBA reasons that even if such a rule would
hypothetically increase the number of WOSBs who benefit, “it would
not serve the purpose of the WOSB Program.”86 The Program’s under-
lying policy is to allow WOSBs to compete effectively with other busi-
nesses, not for all WOSBs to be on equal footing.87 Both the ceiling
on contract price and the so-called “rule of two,”88 although adopted by
the rule as restrictions on contract procurement, have been attacked
by the legislation described below, which was introduced between the
rule’s proposal and final publication.89
B. Fairness in Women-Owned Small Business Contracting Act of 2010
The Fairness in Women-Owned Small Business Contracting Act
was introduced on May 24th, 2010, by Senators Olympia J. Snowe
(R-ME) and Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) through the Senate Committee
for Small Business and Entrepreneurship.90 The Act sought to elimi-
nate the price award caps and to allow the award of sole-source
contracts, in which only one business is available for bidding.91 The per-
tinent section reads as follows: “(7) SOLE SOURCE CONTRACTS.—A
contracting officer may award a sole source contract under this subsec-
tion to a small business concern owned and controlled by women
under the same conditions as a sole source contract may be awarded
to a qualified HUBZone small business concern under section
31(b)(2)(A).”92
The HUBZone program refers to “Historically Underutilized
Business Zones,” an SBA program that “helps small businesses in
urban and rural communities gain preferential access to federal
procurement opportunities.”93 The HUBZone program is often cited by
critics of the SBA’s women-oriented measures, along with the pro-
gram targeting Service-Disabled-Veteran–Owned Small Businesses,
86. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,258,
62,274 (Oct. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, & 134).
87. Id. at 62,258.
88. Id. at 62,274 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 62,258 (showing the final publication of the rule was released on Oct. 7,
2010); S. 3399, 111th Cong. (2010) (showing that the Senate’s legislation was introduced
on May 24, 2010); see Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., supra note 23 (showing
that the rule was proposed in March of 2010);.
90. S. 3399.
91. See id.
92. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. HUBZone Certification, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/hubzone/ (last
visited Mar. 30, 2012).
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as a proposed model for the WOSB Program.94 Why, wonder the Pro-
gram’s critics, should these groups receive more advantages than
small businesses owned by women, despite the latter group’s clear
under-representation?95
The SBA offers only its standard defense, which is that “the
statutory provision creating the WOSB Program does not authorize
sole source awards while the statutory provisions creating the other
programs do.”96 The proposed bill would then have the potential to
overcome this basic obstacle, since the SBA provides no other sub-
stantive justification for the absence of the sole-source provision.97
The bill received high praise from the organization Women Im-
pacting Public Policy (WIPP): “[e]nactment of this legislation will en-
sure that the women’s procurement program is on equal footing with
other programs which enable the federal government to meet its
contracting goals with small businesses.”98 The final rule, however,
was not able to address either price caps or sole source contracts
(which were also submitted in comment-form to the SBA99), pointing
out that without the statutory go-ahead, its hands were tied.100 It
did, however, recognize that “over 700 comments” protested that the
price caps were too low or unnecessary.101 Likewise,“the statutory
provision creating the WOSB Program does not authorize sole source
awards while the statutory provisions creating the other programs do.
In addition, the statutory provisions creating the WOSB Program
specifically state that a contracting officer may use this program only
if the ‘rule of two’ is met.”102
Another directive of the bill is a mandatory five-year review of
the disparity data in order to continually monitor program eligibil-
ity.103 The SBA’s final rule acknowledges such a possibility, but unlike
the other two issues, neither rules it out nor deems it a required
component of the Program: “[r]ather than limiting itself to a particu-
lar timetable for updating the eligible industries,” the SBA opts to
94. See Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at
62,274.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Press Release, Women Impacting Pub. Policy, WIPP Applauds Senators Snowe
and Gillibrand for Introduction of S.3399—Fairness in Women-Owned Small Business
Contracting Act of 2010, available at http://www.wipp.org/resource/resmgr/press _releases
/wippstatementwomensprocureme.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
99. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at 62,274.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Press Release, Women Impacting Pub. Policy, supra note 98.
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play it by ear, conducting reviews “as accurate and timely data be-
come available.”104
This last provision is the only measure over which the SBA has
sole discretion, and the SBA expresses a preference for going at its
own pace in renewing the accuracy and effectiveness of disparity
studies.105 When called on to address the other two measures dealing
respectively with price caps and sole-source contracts, the SBA
refrains from overtly recommending congressional action that would
allow it to make the necessary changes.106 Instead, it pointedly ref-
erences the abundant support for such measures in a detailed review
of the submitted comments.107
The language of the Notice suggests that the rule drafters would
not be opposed to a statutory modification; as WIPP points out, the
bill’s measures seek only to put women “on equal footing with other
programs which enable the federal government to meet its contracting
goals with small businesses” and thus maximize the economy-replen-
ishing force of small businesses as a group.108 The bill has been re-
ferred to the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, and
no new action has been taken since its introduction in May of 2010.109
C. History of Affirmative Action Preference Programs
The following discussion reveals that though the government
has been concerned with nurturing healthy small businesses for
almost a century, only recently has its concern focused on minority-
owned businesses. Amongst minority groups, women occupy a special
place of uncertainty in case law and legislation. Although the U.S.
government has clearly acknowledged the problems facing WOSBs
and pledged to provide aid, as discussed in the previous sections, the
legislative journey for WOSBs has been arduous, disappointing, and
is far from over.
The SBA was created by Congress in 1953, as part of the Small
Business Act, for the purpose of protecting small businesses and
104. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at 62,263.
The SBA goes further than merely acknowledging the suggested studies, pointing out that
“[h]undreds of the comments . . . also stated that the RAND Report data is outdated and
should be updated. In particular, the comments suggested the creation of a regular
timeline for updates to the RAND Report . . . .” Id.
105. Id. 
106. See id. at 62,274.
107. Id.
108. Press Release, Women Impacting Pub. Policy, supra note 98.
109. S.3399 Bill Summary & Status, All Information, THOMAS (Library of Congress),
http://thomas .loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN03399:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited
Mar. 30, 2012).
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helping them to thrive.110 Its genesis was preceded by several govern-
ment agencies, stretching back to the early 1930s, which held the
same basic goals and were created partially as a response to economic
and wartime stresses on business, including the Great Depression,
World War II, and the Korean War.111 A large part of the SBA’s protec-
tion of small businesses was motivated by its goal of helping small
businesses get “a ‘fair proportion’ of government contracts.”112
With the advent of the SBA, the federal government thus
commenced a proactive approach to shielding vulnerable busi-
nesses.113 The approach was reinforced by the Investment Company
Act of 1958, which allowed “the SBA to license, regulate, and help
provide funds for privately owned and operated venture capital invest-
ment firms, which provided long-term debt and equity investments
to high-risk small businesses.”114 The federal government could
justify its special treatment of smaller ventures because “a Federal
Reserve Board study . . . determined, in the simplest terms, that
small businesses could not get the credit they needed to keep pace
with technological advancement.”115 The more small businesses
thrived, the more the country would profit, and because the unat-
tended market did not provide adequate support for these businesses,
legislative action was necessary.116
In the 1960s the government shifted its focus from purely eco-
nomic considerations and began to address opportunities for minori-
ties across all sectors of society.117 The SBA responded to this shift by
creating the Equal Opportunity Loan Program in 1964, with the aim
of aiding economically disadvantaged individuals who had been unable
to secure financing despite having viable business ventures.118 The
SBA also established set-aside regulations meant to aid “‘socially and
economically disadvantaged’ persons” (explicitly including racial
minorities such as Hispanics, African Americans, Native Americans,
and Asians as “socially disadvantaged” groups).119 Women, as a
group, were notably absent from the list.120
110. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 13.
111. Id. at 12–13 (discussing the Small Business Mobilization Act of 1942, the Office
of Small Business in the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the Small Defense Plants
Administration).
112. Id. at 13.
113. See id.
114. Id. 
115. Id. (footnote omitted).
116. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 12–13 (discussing the many federal
actions that were designed to aid small businesses).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 14.
120. See id. 
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The Small Business Act was amended in 1978 to instruct, among
other measures, that each contracting federal agency must have a
Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization Office to aid in imple-
menting the agencies’ goals.121 The amendment also ordered federal
agencies to work to award contracts to minority-owned small busi-
nesses and required that they be held accountable to Congress for
failing to meet their self-established goals regarding this directive.122
Women who did not fit into another racial minority category,
however, were not granted the same presumption of social disadvan-
tage as were other groups.123 Women, a group that had encountered
indisputable social disadvantages, consequently fell behind other mi-
norities in federal contracting; they protested the system “on [the]
grounds that it was too difficult to become qualified on an individual
test basis.”124 Women’s grievances were finally addressed by President
Carter in 1978 in Executive Order 12138.125 The Order directed
federal agencies “to assist women-owned businesses in federal con-
tracting.”126 The Order was followed by The Women’s Business Owner-
ship Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-588),127 which “provided for assistance to
women in starting, managing, and growing small businesses.”128
From the beginning of government involvement in protecting small
businesses, women had fought for recognition and inclusion within the
group of businesses designated as deserving help.129 Though they had
now won inclusion, subsequent government efforts to actually provide
the promised aid consistently fell short of their goals.130
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) at-
tempted to address the inadequacy of past measures by including the
text “small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals, and small business concerns
owned and controlled by women.”131 This suggested that, although
women fall outside of the “socially and economically disadvantaged”
121. Id. at 14–15.
122. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 14.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 15.
125. Id.
126. Id. “At that time, it was estimated that women-owned small businesses received
only 0.2 percent of all federal procurements.” Id. (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 17.
128. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 17.
129. See id. at 15.
130. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-346, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT:
TRENDS AND CHALLENGES IN CONTRACTING WITH WOMEN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESSES 5,
7 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01346.pdf (demonstrating that
goals for awarding contracts to WOSBs had not been met).
131. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, S. 1587, 103d Cong. § 7106(a)(1)
(1994) (enacted) (emphasis added).
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category, they still occupy a special space in which there is an assump-
tion that aid is justified.132
Regarding women specifically, the Act includes the following:
“The Government-wide goal for participation by small business con-
cerns owned and controlled by women shall be established at not less
than 5 percent of the total value of all prime contract and subcontract
awards for each fiscal year.”133 This ambition has thus far proven
sadly unrealistic.134
Subsequent legislation sought to aid both small businesses gener-
ally and women’s businesses as a subset. The Small Business
Reauthorization Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-135) mandated that nearly a
quarter of federal contracts should go to small businesses and pro-
vided that contracts would not be “bundled” (as previously discussed,
the term refers to smaller contracts being grouped into larger clus-
ters), so that smaller firms would not have opportunities to bid.135
Ten years ago, the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2000,
reacting to the fact that the five percent goal had not yet been met,
authorized a set-aside program specifically for WOSBs.136 The Act also
promoted program fairness by requiring an SBA-administered study
of each industry to determine whether women were under-repre-
sented.137 The government has thus far recognized the problem of
under-representation, pledged procurement goals in response, and
implemented legislation in an effort to meet its goals.138 The past ten
years have demonstrated that this final action, crucial to the actual
success of WOSBs, has been the most difficult to execute.
Two Supreme Court decisions address the government’s ability to
establish race-based programs, the treatment of which may be con-
trasted with WOSB programs. The first, City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., dealt with Richmond’s requirement that city construction
contracts subcontract at least thirty percent of the contract amount to
“Minority Business Enterprises,” the definition of which included
exclusively race-based minorities139 (defined as “Blacks, Spanish-
speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts”).140
132. See id.
133. Id. § 7106 (a)(2)(A) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 130, at 5, 7 (recounting the
percentage of contracts awarded in the first four years following the Act’s implementation,
and the pessimism of government agencies as to whether the five percent goal could be met).
135. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 17.
136. Id. at 17–18.
137. Id. at 18.
138. Id. at 17–18 (listing government responses to the problem of under-representation
of women in business).
139. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477–78 (1989).
140. Id. at 478 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Court concluded that state and local governments were
constrained to an equal protection “strict scrutiny” test in developing
such programs.141 Under this two-pronged test, “racial preferences
must serve a ‘compelling interest’ and be ‘narrowly tailored’ to meet
that need.”142 The Court warned against liberal use of race-based
programs, characterizing it as “a highly suspect tool” with “a danger
of stigmatic harm” that could “promote notions of racial inferiority.”143
It went on to criticize the “gross overinclusiveness” of the thirty per-
cent mandate and to state that it could not possibly be construed as a
narrowly tailored response to past discrimination.144
Regarding contracts, the Court proposed the following test for
discrimination: “Where there is a significant statistical disparity
between the number of qualified minority contractors willing and able
to perform a particular service and the number of such contractors
actually engaged by the locality or the locality’s prime contractors, an
inference of discriminatory exclusion could arise.”145
If the SBA were constrained by such strict scrutiny in its gender-
based policy, it would have passed the test; as the text of the final
rule shows, the SBA has taken great pains through its statistical stud-
ies to justify the “under-represented” label when it is applied to women
in certain industries. “Women” as a category is more general and far
less arbitrary than the eligible minorities listed in the law in City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.146 Finally, the national five percent
goal for women is intuitively more reasonable than a local thirty
percent requirement.147
The second case, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, expanded
the strict scrutiny test to apply to federal agencies.148 In that case, a
subcontracting construction company submitted the lowest bid but
was overlooked in favor of a company certified as a small business
being managed “by ‘socially and economically disadvantaged individu-
als.’”149 The Court explained that “[f ]ederal law requires that a
subcontracting clause . . . state that ‘[t]he contractor shall presume
141. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. Id.
143. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493.
144. Id. at 506.
145. Id. at 509.
146. Id. at 485 (“[T]he statistics comparing the minority population of Richmond to
the percentage of prime contracts awarded to minority firms had little or no probative
value in establishing prior discrimination in the relevant market . . . .”).
147. See id. at 510 (concluding that because “the city has not ascertained how many
minority enterprises are present in the local construction market nor the level of their
participation in city construction projects,” it could not logically apply the 30 percent
mandate for minority projects).
148. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
149. Id. at 205.
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that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include
Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian
Pacific Americans, and other minorities, or any other individual
found to be disadvantaged by the [Small Business] Administration.’”150
The lowest-bidding company challenged the U.S. Department of
Transportation’s contract program, arguing that its race discrimina-
tion violated the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.151 The Court
agreed that the Program was constitutionally suspect and remanded
the case, stating that “[t]he question whether any of the ways in which
the Government uses subcontractor compensation clauses can survive
strict scrutiny, and any relevance distinctions such as these may have
to that question, should be addressed in the first instance by the
lower courts.”152
The decision resulted in a government-wide review of all race-
based programs, acting with the directive “to ‘mend it [affirmative
action] not end it.’”153 Race-based legislation has taken center stage, in
court and in Congress, in the rhetoric on law that addresses minori-
ties. Women, although a minority group in their own right, are
treated separately (and hesitatingly) in both arenas.154
Gender-based programs, in contrast with the previously discussed
cases, must only meet an “intermediate scrutiny” standard of review
as set forth in United States v. Virginia,155 in order to pass constitu-
tional muster.156 The facts of United States v. Virginia may not be on
point, but deal generally with the constitutionality of gender-based
programs. The question at issue was whether a military school that
had historically restricted admission to male candidates was consti-
tutionally permitted to continue its gender-exclusive policy.157
The Court, considering that “[n]either the goal of producing
citizen-soldiers nor [the school’s] implementing methodology is inher-
ently unsuitable to women,” decided that the gender-based policy put
women at a disadvantage and was unconstitutional.158 The Court
accepted as “well settled” that it “evaluate[s] a statutory classifica-
tion based on sex” by an “intermediate scrutiny” standard.159 In the
intermediate scrutiny analysis, the government’s purpose does not
150. Id. (second and third alterations in original) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 637 (d)(2)–(3)).
151. Id. at 205–06.
152. Id. at 238–39.
153. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 19 (alteration in original).
154. See id. at 21 (describing how courts treat women differently as a minority category).
155. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
156. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 22.
157. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520, 531.
158. Id. at 520, 556–58.
159. See id. at 570.
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need to be “compelling,” only “important,” and “narrowly tailored” is
downgraded to “substantially related.”160
The Court found that the school’s policy did not pass this weaker
test,161 but expressed some doubt towards the distinction.162 As the
NRC indicates, “lower court decisions applying the equal protection
doctrine to government contracting have not yet clarified precisely
how the [strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny] standards differ.”163
The Court in United States v. Virginia agreed, hinting that it
considered the tests to be somewhat, and perhaps mostly, arbitrary:
“These tests are no more scientific than their names suggest, and a
further element of randomness is added by the fact that it is largely up
to us which test will be applied in each case.”164 Legal analysis suffers
from the same vagueness as legislative text: women are different, but
we are not quite sure how.
The parameters are further blurred by the fact that, unlike race-
based programs, gender-based programs have relatively “sparse”
litigation behind them that could shed light on how procurement
programs for women and other minorities might differ.165 One such
case is Michigan Road Builders Association, Inc. v. Milliken,166 in
which the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of state set-aside
provisions for contracts to minority-run businesses and women-
owned businesses.167
The court decided that both provisions were unconstitutional,
applying strict scrutiny to the policy affecting minorities and inter-
mediate scrutiny to that affecting women.168 On women, the court
stated that “[e]ven under this less stringent standard of review, the
[policy] cannot withstand constitutional attack since evidence of record
that the state discriminated against women is nonexistent. Defen-
dants’ reliance upon general assertions of societal discrimination are
insufficient to satisfy their burden absent some indication [of past
discrimination against women].”169
Although the court leaves no room for doubt in this assertion, it
is clearly more comfortable discussing the constitutionality of race-
based programs than gender-based ones: “the court spends sixteen of
160. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 22.
161. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 519.
162. Id. at 567.
163. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 22.
164. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 567.
165. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 21.
166. Mich. Rd. Builders Ass’n v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987), aff’d, 489 U.S.
1061 (1989).
167. Id. at 584.
168. Id. at 594–95.
169. Id. at 595.
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its seventeen-page opinion discussing, analyzing, and deciding wheth-
er the race-based minority programs are constitutional; the court
spends one page on the issue of gender-based set-aside programs.”170
Critics of the “nonexistent” evidence line of reasoning have sug-
gested that it falls below basic principles of fairness for women who
seek to prove under-representation and disadvantage, especially if a
set-aside program is not already in place: “[i]t appears that a success-
ful case requires pleading with great specificity, and generous sup-
porting evidence, the rather obvious notion that women have been
discriminated against throughout the history of the United States.”171
It has also been suggested that this case demonstrates the problematic
practice in which courts group women-oriented legislation together
with minority-oriented legislation and give a blanket ruling for both:
Even with the lesser standard of review for gender-based set-
aside programs, if the race-based provisions are unable to pass
constitutional muster, the unfortunate result is that [the] entire
statute is held to violate the Equal Protection Clause. An in-
cluded gender-based provision might otherwise pass an interme-
diate scrutiny standard of review if heard separately.172
There is also irony in the fact that, “[u]nfortunately for the set-aside
laws,” courts may use the same anti-discrimination arguments “that
were originally designed to support women’s increased access to
society and opportunity” to invalidate the laws by proposing that they
discriminate against men.173
The Fairness in Women-Owned Small Business Contracting Act
of 2010 clearly hopes to address some of the discrepancies that remain
between gender-based set asides for federal contract procurement and
other programs that provide aid for disadvantaged groups. The lan-
guage, while keeping women separate from other minority categories,
seeks to close the gap in fair treatment between the two.174 Although
the Program is welcomed by WOSBs and their supporters, it is also,
as the cases above show, open to constitutional criticism for not being
substantially related to an important governmental purpose.175 The
most obviously identifiable governmental purpose relates to the
170. Michael D. Wright, Note, Set-Aside Programs for Women-Owned Businesses: Do
Women Add Diversity to Society?, 26 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 181, 190 (2005).
171. Id. at 184.
172. Id. at 185.
173. Id. at 187–88.
174. See Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 62, 258,
62,258 (Oct. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, & 134).
175. See Mich. Rd. Builders Ass’n v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583, 595 (6th Cir. 1987), aff’d,
489 U.S. 1061 (1989) (requiring laws that single out women to be related to an important
government purpose).
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remedy of past discrimination, but there are other equally valid mo-
tives, both economic and social, for protecting WOSBs.176
II. NECESSITY OF THE PROGRAM
The Program is essential for several reasons. First, it addresses
the weaknesses of small businesses in general. Second, it promotes
market diversity. And third, studies have confirmed that women-
owned businesses are a vital and lucrative sector of the economy.
The federal government’s protection of said businesses not only
defends a vulnerable subset, but extends benefits across all eco-
nomic regions.
A. Market Diversity
The presence and continued advancement of set-aside programs
for minority-owned small businesses, “a severely underutilized na-
tional resource,”177 has been touted as crucial to economic growth
because they spur businesses to self-perpetuating expansion: “[t]he
opportunities created by set-asides, preferential procurement policies,
and similar programs have induced better-educated, younger minority
entrepreneurs to create and expand firms in the skill-intensive and
capital-intensive lines of business where the presence of minority-
owned firms traditionally has been minimal.”178
The businesses in question are also generally weaker than their
larger, better-established counterparts; this opens the door to valid
criticism of supportive programs that divert funding from safer, and
therefore potentially more profitable, investments: “minority-owned
businesses: (1) are less profitable as a group; (2) have an incidence of
nonprofitability that is over four times greater than nonminorities;
(3) are highly leveraged and thus vulnerable to delinquency on debt
obligations, making actual failure more likely; and (4) are a younger
group of firms.”179
The benefits, however, of preserving minority businesses as
active economic players outweigh their perceived weaknesses:
The [disadvantaged business] program is essential for the future
development of small disadvantaged minority businesses. In
most urban and many rural areas of the country, these small
and minority owned firms are the primary employers of other
176. See Hasty, supra note 14, at 112.
177. Id. at 1.
178. Id. at 2–3.
179. Id. at 3.
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minorities living within these communities. Increasing the via-
bility of these businesses would create more jobs, enhance tax
revenues, decrease government subsistence payments, and con-
tribute to an improved quality of life and standard of living for
all Americans.180
Although these opinions provide convincing support for minority pro-
tection, they risk falling into the trap whereby women are discussed
in the same breath as race, two categories in which economic and
social factors may be very different.
More specific support for women’s issues comes from other coun-
tries, which have recognized the need to protect women-owned busi-
nesses.181 In his article on the uneasy relationship between “gender”
and “diversity” in the United States legal arena, Michael D. Wright
cites the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women (CEDAW), ratified by the United Nations in
1979.182 The United States, notably, is not among the 179 nations that
have signed onto the convention.183
Wright provides opposing viewpoints to illuminate the dialogue
that the United States would face if it were ever to ratify the treaty;
the first voice is that of U.S. Senator Jesse Helms: “CEDAW ‘is a bad
treaty; it is a terrible treaty negotiated by radical feminists with the
intent of enshrining their radical antifamily agenda into international
law.’”184 The second is that of the Director of International Women’s
Rights Action Watch: “the participation of women from all re-
gions—and in all their diversity—in the setting of international norms
is also critical because of the need for universal minimum standards
of human rights. This is so especially in light of the rising fundamen-
talism in many countries around the world.”185
Wright also points out that while the United States has wavered
on gender-based set-asides, other countries have done more to promul-
gate similar quotas for women, in both government positions and
business opportunities.186 The United States has been slow to follow,
but the international community has plainly opined that women are
of enough value as a diverse group to warrant protection in the
global economy.187
180. Id. at 112 (footnote omitted).
181. See Wright, supra note 170, at 182.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 183.
184. Id. at 189.
185. Id. (quoting SHANTHI DAIRIAM, BRINGING EQUALITY HOME: IMPLEMENTING THE
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
9 (Ilana Landsberg-Lewis ed., 1998)).
186. Id.
187. Wright, supra note 170, at 189.
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B. Economic Value of WOSBs Validates Government Programs
The Center for Women’s Business Research has published a 2009
study on the special market value of women-owned businesses.188
According to this study, recent data shows that 28.2 percent of all
businesses in the United States are owned by women, accounting for
only 4.2 percent of all revenue.189 This relatively small amount is due
to the fact that the majority of these businesses are small, and there-
fore more likely to be less profitable from an objective perspective.190
The Center’s study reflects, “for the first time, a comprehensive
analysis of the economic impact of women-owned businesses in the
United States by using primary data collected through direct surveys
and government sources.”191
The study draws its numbers from a comprehensive market
analysis, including the effect of the “measure of total sales or revenues
generated by women business owners,” the “total income generated
within the U.S. economy,” and the “measure of the number of jobs
created.”192 It also examines the “direct impact” (the direct purchase
of goods and services by women-owned businesses) and the “indirect
impact” (purchases made by business suppliers from other suppli-
ers).193 The study’s conclusion firmly supports the economic impor-
tance of WOSBs:
The results of over $2.8 trillion dollars annually from majority-
women-owned firms coupled with the more than 23 million people
who are employed directly and indirectly by these firms again
proves that women-owned firms are not a small, niche market
but are a major contributor and player in the overall economy.194
While “diversity” appears to be dubiously ascribed as a compelling
defense of women-favoring programs, “profitable” is a more concrete
term, and certainly better appreciated from an objective economic
perspective. A subset that is responsible for providing roughly sixteen
percent of U.S. jobs is worth not only monitoring, but pushing to
further achievement.195
188. CTR. FOR WOMEN’S BUS. RESEARCH, supra note 6.
189. Id. at 2.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 10.
192. Id. at 2.
193. Id. 
194. CTR. FOR WOMEN’S BUS. RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 10.
195. Id. at 1.
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III. THE FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM
The economic outlook for the United States is uncertain, and the
federal government has responded with measures that are too young
to be evaluated for either effectiveness or constitutional durability.
The Program represents a step forward specifically for WOSBs, and
the current administration hopes to promote small businesses in
general: “[federal] agencies will be pushed to increase the number of
small businesses hired for contracts.”196
On the flip side of this initiative is the administration’s pledge to
cut government spending, which naturally will effect the flow of money
for all contracts: the government has reported that in the past fiscal
year, it has spent $535 billion on contract-spending, representing a
$15 billion decrease and “the first year-to-year cuts in such costs since
1997.”197 The government hopes to cut contract-spending by another
$25 billion, with a 2012 fiscal policy that will include “a 10 percent
reduction in professional and technical service contracts.”198
Small businesses have managed to remove contract bundling from
the equation,199 although the practice aimed merely to promote
government efficiency. They may have a tougher time arguing that the
policy of saving money is similarly unfair, although it too will empty
the pool of funding available to these ventures.
Through its efforts, the government purports to cut unnecessary
costs, eliminate redundant contracts, and confront “the trend of uncon-
trollable growth [in government spending].”200 The potential trouble for
WOSBs lies in the fact that with all the cost-cutting on the horizon,
officials are hesitant to say which sectors will suffer the most, whether
jobs will be lost, and whether contracts will be cancelled or merely re-
duced.201 These reductions have been unprecedented, at least in the
last decade, and all contracting businesses are likely to feel a degree
of insecurity about their future. With fewer contracts and less money
to go around, there may be an increased likelihood that set-aside pro-
grams, particularly newer and less well-established ones such as the
SBA’s provision for WOSBs, will suffer more protests of unconstitu-
tionality.
196. Ed O’Keefe, OMB Reports $15 Billion in Government Contracting Cuts, WASH.
POST, Feb. 4, 2011, at A20.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. (stating that “agencies will be pushed to increase the number of small busi-
nesses hired for contracts,” an effort likely aimed to curb possible contract bundling).
200. Id. (quoting Office of Management and Budget Deputy Director Jeffrey D. Zients).
201. Id.
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As the case law demonstrates, courts have not presented a united
front on how to treat women as a group; the line between strict and
intermediate scrutiny is hazy and open to interpretation, as are the
components of such tests.202 Furthermore, it is not clear whether
promoting diversity or discouraging discrimination best serves as
the “important” government interest that justifies said programs;
proving either assertion comes with its own set of problems.
Proponents have met the set-asides with overwhelming approval,
and most criticism received by the SBA calls for even greater pro-
tections.203 With time, as the government further reduces its spend-
ing and the actual effects of the Program become evident, more serious
opposition to the policy might find a voice.
CONCLUSION
The Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program
has nearly a century of history behind its genesis.204 The history
combines a host of legislative, social, and economic factors that have
funneled down, in 2011, to specifically address the needs of WOSBs.
The government gradually became more involved in protecting small
businesses; case law established women as a subset of the population
for which special policies might apply, then the Supreme Court affixed
an intermediate scrutiny standard to such policies.205 The legislative
branch has enacted laws that seek to acknowledge and establish
goals regarding the procurement issue.206
In conjunction with this process, the SBA has engaged in a
prolonged process of trial and error with commenters to create
legislation that will sufficiently address the under-representation of
women in a variety of industries. The text of the rule, conscious of
its past and future deficiencies, provides an in-depth response to
each concern about the Program’s adequacy. The SBA defends the
reasoning behind its methodology where applicable, and takes care to
emphasize repeatedly the areas in which it does not have the au-
thority to act without a statutory amendment. These problematic
202. See Wright, supra note 170, at 182–83 (discussing different treatments of women
as a group by various courts).
203. Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,258,
62,259 (Oct. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, & 134).
204. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 12–13 (discussing the history of
government action regarding small businesses).
205. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570–71 (1996) (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486
U.S. 456, 461 (1988)) (applying the intermediate scrutiny standard to women).
206. See Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at
62,258; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 12–18 (discussing various laws
passed by Congress throughout the years).
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areas, showing noteworthy discrepancies between the WOSB Pro-
gram and similar programs for disadvantaged groups, reflect the
complex legislative and judicial development of the “women” minority
designation. Although the category indisputably exists, courts and
legislators have treated it with comparative hesitancy, vagueness,
and uncertainty.207
As the Program stands on the brink of performance, the SBA
appears to have satisfied most of the earlier draft’s critics. But while
the market struggles towards recovery and the federal government
continues its precarious balancing act of decreased spending versus
small-business protections, pitfalls are likely. Although the Program
currently rides high on optimism for its ability to protect the inter-
ests of WOSBs, only time will tell whether it will be truly effective
and the extent to which others will challenge its enactment.
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